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ABSTRACT 
It is acutely recognized in the Probabilistic Risk Assessment 
(PRA) field that software plays a defining role in overall system 
reliability for all modern systems across a wide variety of 
industries.  Regardless of whether the software is embedded 
firmware for working components or elements, part of a 
Human-Machine-Interface, or automated command and 
control logic, the success of the software to fulfill its function 
under nominal and off-nominal environments will be a 
dominant contributor to system reliability.  It is also recognized 
that software reliability prediction and estimation is one of the 
more challenging and questionable aspects of any PRA or 
system analyses due to the nature of software and its integration 
with physics based systems.  Irrespective of this dichotomy, any 
incorporation of software reliability methods requires that the 
contributions are accountable, quantitative, and tractable.  
This paper provides a brief overview of software reliability 
methods, establishes some minimum requirements that the 
methods should incorporate for completeness, and provides a 
logic structure for applying software reliability.  Model 
resolution will be discussed that supports current testing plans 
and trade studies.  We will provide initial recommendations for 
use in the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) PRA and present a future dynamic option for software 
and PRA. 
Space Launch Vehicle software is recognized to be reliable in 
static conditions, yet relatively vulnerable to a set of failure 
modes in changing environments/flight phases. Two 
quantitative methods were chosen to incorporate software 
reliability into a Space Launch Vehicle PRA accounting for 
phase adjustments.  One method predicts latent software failure 
using statistical methods, and the second provides estimates of 
coding errors and software operating system failures based on 
test and historical data.  Software uncertainty will also be 
discussed.  It is determined that recommendations for PRA 
software reliability should be modeled at the software module 
level where multiple software components compose a module 
and combinations of the software architecture can lead to a 
functional failure.   
INTRODUCTION 
Software risk estimates and predictions are difficult to 
quantify and incorporate into a formal risk assessment not 
only because software has inherent characteristics that differ 
from hardware [1], but also because software can fail in 
similar modes and generate significantly dissimilar 
 
unpredicted effects on a system.  Yet software plays a critical 
part in all space launch systems.  This part is only going to 
increase as cost and schedule pressures mount in a budget-
tight space industry.  Software is inherent in every space 
launch electronic element in some manner and often 
participates in actuation; in particular, it controls the avionics 
system during ascent and can contribute significantly to 
system risk during this flight stage. 
An apparent and often erroneous reliability approach to 
estimating software reliability is the treatment of software 
like a standard hardware component.  Software and hardware 
contain some dissimilar features that pertain to reliability and 
risk. Software does not wear out and is often very reliable in 
static conditions. This can be seen with orbiting satellite 
historical data that exhibit minor dynamic changes after 
startup and upon reaching designated orbit. Software is not 
subject directly to environmental stressors such as 
temperature, pressure, and vibration and there are typically 
no warnings or indications prior to a software failure. 
Hardware has physical connections or interfaces such as 
power lines and communication cables while software 
connections are virtual and often obscure.  Software can 
potentially repair itself with a reboot and software 
redundancy and standard parts are truly a different concept 
than with hardware.  Therefore, although modeling software 
in a PRA can be accomplished in a similar manner to 
hardware via deductive reasoning, the quantification and 
application of software failures needs to be accomplished 
within the constraints of software characteristics.  
This paper will provide an example application of modeling 
and software reliability estimates that may be applied to other 
industries. This approach was established when avionics 
software was in the development stage, yet the basic structure 
and specifications were known well enough to establish 
preliminary design, documents, and functional requirements. 
The paper is organized into the following sections:  the 
general approach, quantification of the approach, an estimate 
of uncertainty, design modification, and testing scheme 
discussions.  
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1. GENERAL APPROACH FOR SOFTWARE 
FAILURE RATES 
1.1 Methods 
Methods for estimating software failures vary from complex 
algorithms to qualifying organizational effectiveness. 
Software failures, unlike their counterparts in hardware are 
due entirely to human error rather than being influenced by 
physical or environmental factors. Qualitative methods may 
be based on project management and identify organizational 
and management influence on the code outcome and 
reliability. Another method focuses on the process of code 
development and relies on a function of upgrade and software 
improvements to reach a steady state of reliability. 
Quantitative methods include reviewing fault and failure data 
and estimating reliability trending from defect density. The 
better methods for use in PRA are quantitative and based on 
historical information that is close to the target if available.  
Some software applications, such as SoftRel use qualitative 
factors such as testing time, organizational experience, and 
quality requirements, as well as a wide historical defect 
density database.  This approach is very good for answering 
questions beyond the specific PRA question of failure rate.  
For example, it can be used to provide to a safety program an 
estimate of the time required for testing to establish an 
acceptable failure rate.    
1.2 Historical Data 
This approach quantifies failure rates extracted from similar 
historical data rather than actual data or heuristic reliability 
predictions for several reasons.  First and foremost, this 
approach is for software under development and not 
completed.  Specifically, where official testing of the 
software is under initiation and defect density does not have 
the historical basis to estimate current failure rate data for the 
space craft software available.  Secondly, the use of heuristic 
reliability predictions was considered to be less accurate than 
using similar historical data.  Lastly, there were ample similar 
historical data available from space launch vehicles such as 
the Space Shuttle.  Similar is a relative term; however, for 
example the Space Shuttle avionics system may have some 
striking similarities to more modern vehicles despite the time 
differences when it was designed and built from some 
modern space craft, including a voting computer group, 
similar software languages, similar main engines and 
boosters, and many similar functional interfacing avionics 
boxes.  Nevertheless, there were some obvious differences 
with some modern space craft.  The question regarding use 
of the Space Shuttle historical data was whether the major 
differences could be adjusted to better reflect space launch 
craft.  Even if this adjustment could not be accomplished, the 
authors felt that the historical data would better represent 
space launch craft software failure rates than other prediction 
approaches.  Fortunately, after reviewing the data and 
calculations used in the Space Shuttle Program, there were 
adjustments that reflected the space launch craft such that the 
historical data would provide reasonable failure predictions.  
Some adjustments may need to be incorporated such as 
removing the effectiveness of the back-up computer system 
considered in the Space Shuttle since some space launch 
systems do not have a back-up computer, using the 
percentage of flight time in ascent and in space since the 
failure rate was based on total mission time, and adjusting the 
number of critical software failure reports (DR-1s) to reflect 
potential failures during the associated phases.  
The historical data is based on the Primary Avionics 
Software System (PASS) report [3].  The quantitative basis 
for the failure rate in the PASS report is the Source Line of 
Code (SLOC).  SLOC represents a reasonable, although 
debatable, measure of code complexity and quality especially 
when using similar coding rules, languages, and 
specifications such as the PASS and some space launch craft 
coding practices.  For the PRA, the level of coding expertise 
and organizational aspects that can affect defect density is 
considered to be similar to the Space Shuttle. The PASS also 
takes into account coding and context errors; the latter 
represents latent errors that occurred during off-nominal 
flights that made it through testing and on to Space Shuttle 
flights. Some of these errors (critical and non-critical) were 
on an operational increment (OI) of the code that flew 
multiple Space Shuttle missions [3]. 
1.3 Software Failure Modes 
A logical progression of predicting software reliability starts 
with the anticipated Failure Mission Scenarios (FMS) and 
progresses through a set of software failure modes that are 
determined based on what could cause the designated 
scenarios.  Then the portion of the code that could cause each 
of the failure modes is determined and a historical failure rate 
for the apportioned code, adjusted for space launch craft, is 
applied to the failure modes.  The numeric SLOC was 
determined to be the common measurement to relate the 
Space Shuttle failure rates with predictive space launch craft 
values. Software contributions to these FMS can account for 
distinct failure modes and are considered to be mutually 
exclusive.   
Most space launch vehicles’ software uses some form of 
ARCINC 653 specification [1] that provides some resiliency 
in safety-critical application by partitioning major functions.  
Each partition acts separately and can fail without harming 
other partitions. Next, the Flight Software (FS) structure is 
segregated into functional partitions that are made up of one 
or more modules.  Each partition is a functional construct that 
is also directly related to a computer process (i.e., each 
partition has its own process) that is monitored by the 
operating system.  Software failure modes can be caused by 
a specific failure of either code in a set of partitions or 
modules depending on their function.  Using this approach, a 
total SLOC can be determined for each failure mode.  Fig. 1 
represents a representation of different failure modes and 
their definitions.  As can be seen in Fig. 1, some partitions or 
modules may cause different software failure modes to occur.  
For example, a management partition includes the time and 
mode manager modules.  Therefore, an early command 
software failure (error in the management partition) and loss 
of communication (requires an increment in the time stamp 
from the time manager module) could potentially be caused 
by loss of functionality of the management partition.  When 
the SLOC for the same partition is accounted for in multiple 
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failure modes it should be noted that the total software failure 
rate needs to be normalized such that the total SLOC of 
critical code equals the total software failure SLOC to avoid 
double counting.  
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Figure 1.  Notional Software Failure Modes and Associated Partitions 
1.4 Maturity Ranges 
It is recognized that software tends to mature over time and 
when it is applied under different scenarios errors often get 
recognized and removed.  New functionality or 
modifications that represent a new release also introduce 
new errors.  There is often an accounting between finding 
errors and introducing new errors to determine the current 
defect density of the code at any given time.  This can be 
clearly seen and calculated in the PASS report [2]. 
The PASS report divides the failures and ultimately the 
defect densities into three broad ranges that represent the 
PASS reliability growth curve for the Space Shuttle. These 
include an immature, mid-mature, and mature failure rate of 
the software.  An immature range would represent first 
flight, whereas the mid-mature range/defect density may 
characterize reuse of some systems for flight.  In keeping 
with the Space Shuttle methodology and providing software 
reliability predictions for different needs of reliability 
development, three levels of maturity are calculated for the 
avionics software.  In effect, the ranges represent the 
uncertainty of the total reliability curve over time.  
2. UNCERTAINTY BOUNDS 
Ironically, the testing data collection was more defined and 
structured at the end of the Space Shuttle’s mission life and 
represents the best data (least uncertain) collected.  The 
probability of a SLOC leading to a Severity 1 error includes:  
the total defect probability; the probability the error makes 
it through three different testing schemes; the probability the 
error is on the flight; the probability the error is a Severity 1 
error; and the probability that the backup computer fails to 
be effective in the scenario.  Errors and operations found at 
the three different levels of testing are inputs into a beta 
distribution in the PASS report and portray an increase in 
uncertainty as the testing levels increase (initial testing to 
final testing) due to the decrease in total operations and 
errors respectively as one would anticipate.  These 
parameters and their uncertainty are shown in Fig. 2. 
2.1 Software Distributions 
The avionics software prediction uses the same approach to 
define uncertainty about the mean.  A representative 
depiction of the uncertainty for avionics software is seen in 
Fig. 3 for the three different ranges. 
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Figure 2.  Notional Example of Uncertainty Ranges for Software Risk Elements Determining SLOC Failure Rate
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Figure 3.  Notional Calculation and Uncertainty for a 100 KSLOC Across Maturity Levels 
Actual NASA values are not shown in this paper, although 
the uncertainty represents an accurate range for the 
associated maturity levels.  The uncertainty charts were 
developed in R [4] using a 5,000 Monte Carlo sampling 
routine.  The uncertainty, as denoted by an error factor of the 
mature level, is about 3.2.  The uncertainty is on the low side 
due to the size of the data sets and accounts for additional 
uncertainty of the adjustment factors (mentioned above) that 
apply the software failure rates from Space Shuttle to new 
space launch craft.  Uncertainty increased for earlier data 
represented by Immature and Mid-Mature values because the 
latter (Mature) data sets in the Space Shuttle were collected 
more according to the testing schemes.  Hence the Immature 
and Mid-Mature values were derived from the Mature data 
set.  
3. TESTING 
When hardware design modifications, such as adding 
computer redundancy or an independent backup computer, 
are limited and organizational and team expertise are 
established, the ability to reduce software unreliability via 
defect rates relies often on testing. One unique aspect about 
modern space craft avionics is that all flight computers may 
act as a voting group and run the exact same versions of the 
software on each computer.  Therefore, an avionics software 
error will be apparent on all computers defeating the 
hardware redundancy.  
Testing provides a manner to reduce the defect density 
theoretically to zero using some popular prediction methods 
[5].  Although theoretical values may be based on an 
elongated schedule, reality provides limited testing and 
assumes that some errors make it through even the best 
testing schemes and practices.  The likelihood of this 
occurring increases with code complexity.  Applying a set of 
metrics to testing and data collection is an initial task.  The 
more challenging effort is in assessing the quality of the tests.  
Based on the complexity of the space launch craft flight and 
phases, the number of FMS combinatorial failures are far 
more numerous than can be tested with-in schedule.  PRA 
can both support the testing schemes and, as test results begin 
to emerge, use the results to hone software reliability 
predictions. 
With the potential for an inordinate number of potential 
scenarios for modern space launch craft due to the 
complexity of the systems and subsystems, the prioritized 
ranked risk of each avionics FMS scenario is an obvious 
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starting point for testing.  Testing should include these top 
scenarios for functional testing.  Each avionics FMS scenario 
provides associated logic and identifies specific software 
failure modes.  Therefore, component and integrated testing 
can also benefit from the PRA logic models. 
Course adjustment testing presents a facet in testing that is 
less practiced.  As defects are revealed and tracked, the 
opportunity to provide feedback to how defects manifest to 
specific software failure modes becomes possible.  Use of a 
Bayesian updating technique where prior distributions are 
developed from the Space Shuttle historical data and the 
posterior distribution includes space launch craft testing 
results would improve predictions.  
4. CONCLUSION 
Software reliability predictions are a very difficult and 
challenging aspect of space flight engineering.  Historical 
data can provide an alternative to demonstrated reliability 
information for critical systems under development given 
that the systems and approaches are similar.  For the avionics 
system, the use of Space Shuttle avionics data provides a 
basis for predicting avionics software and a method for 
quantifying software specific failure modes. Maturity and 
uncertainty values provide a probabilistic approach to new, 
similar, or hybrid systems. 
This approach has the potential to be generalized/ tailored for 
other aerospace or industrial operations.  Applications to 
other industries would need to establish uncertainty bounds  
for the specific application applicability.  Critical aspects of 
this approach are the determination of software failure modes 
and the identification of the relationship between the 
software architecture and these failure modes, which 
provides a basis for applying historical data.  PRA can use 
this approach to conduct case studies and to aid in abort 
trigger assignments and priorities.  As testing progresses and 
defect data is collected, PRA has the potential to provide 
course correction to the testing team. 
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